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Abstract—This paper describes the functionality and realisa-
tion of the smart metering infrastructure in the Netherlands, and
discusses the changes that have been made in plans in response
to privacy and security concerns. We also discuss the rationale
for introducing smart meters – which is less clear than one would
expect or indeed hope – and ongoing developments in the use of
smart metering information in local energy community pilots.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE advent of smart electricity meters sparked a lot ofpublic debate and media attention in the Netherlands in
2008. The debate has involved grid operators, privacy advo-
cates, politicians, security experts, consumer interest groups
such as the Dutch consumers’ and homeowners’ associations.
A decade onwards, the debate still does not seem to be
completely settled.
In 2014 the Dutch government decided to go ahead with
the roll-put of smart meters to every home [1]. The reported
numbers – nearly 3 million households equipped with a smart
meter at the end of 2016 [2] – suggests the roll-out is on track
to reach the target mentioned in EU Directive 2009/72/EC [3],
namely that 80% of households have a smart meter by 2020.
The set-up of a smart metering infrastructure – or Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI), to use the technical term –
involves many design choices. A global overview of the
communication technology and trends of smart metering can
be found in [4], [5]. Although the Netherlands is discussed
briefly, we feel a more detailed review is warranted. It is
interesting to review how and why certain choices have been
made in the Netherlands, also to be able to compare different
approaches between countries. It is not easy to find this
information: it is scattered over many documents, mostly in
Dutch, and typically without any discussion of motivation or
rationale. This paper aims to give an overview accessible to
an international audience.
Section II describes the smart metering infrastructure as
deployed in the Netherlands, from both a technical and an
organizational point of view. Section III then discusses security
and privacy issues that were raised and how they were dealt
with, as well as some incididents – data leaks – that happened.
Section IV discusses the rationale for smart meters given the
current use and Section V discusses more intensive use of
smart metering information in pilots with microgrids. We draw
our main conclusions in Section VI.
This work is supported by the EU Regional Development Fund (EFRO),
as part of the project BES (Betuwse Energie Samenwerking).
II. THE ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE
This section describes the AMI as is it deployed in the
Netherlands: the parties involved, the functionality of the smart
meters, which information is collected and exchanged, and
how it is exchanged. The main parties involved in the metering
infrastructure are illustrated in Fig. 1 and discussed below.
The Distribution System Operator (DSO), or grid operator
is responsible for the operation of the electrical grid at a
regional level. The DSO is typically also responsible for the
installation of smart meters and for collecting meter readings.
The Dutch DSOs are united in a collaborative industry body
called Netbeheer Nederland (literally ‘Netherlands Grid Man-
agement’). This organization establishes and publishes e.g. the
common terms of service for electricity transport and smart
meter standards. There are 7 DSOs in the Netherlands, with
the 3 biggest – Liander, Enexis, and Stedin – serving the bulk
of the country.
The energy suppliers (energy suppliers) are the commercial
parties that produce or buy electricity and sell it to consumers.
They use the infrastructure of the DSO to deliver this electric-
ity. Formerly, a single utility would act as both DSO and
ES, but since the liberalization of the energy market in 1998
these roles have been separated, allowing customers to freely
choose their energy supplier, while the DSO retains its regional
monopoly.
With the introduction of smart meters came a new category
of parties: the Independent Service Providers (ISPs)1. ISPs use
meter readings to offer additional services, e.g. providing more
detailed insight in electricity, say via a smartphone app, or
more generally giving advice on how to save energy. ISP can
offer such services to households or businesses. As a concrete
example, an ISP can offer a supermarkt chain insight in energy
use across all their stores.
To bill a customer, the energy supplier needs the relevant
meter readings for the responsible DSO. Rather than broker
many-to-many relationships between DSOs and energy sup-
pliers, the Dutch DSOs have set up Energie Data Services
Nederland (EDSN) as a central organization to smooth the
administrative processes. EDSN’s responsibilities include pro-
viding metering data to energy suppliers and ISPs, irrespective
of the DSO responsible for the region where a customer
is located. Prior to the introduction of smart meters EDSN
already provided one common interface for energy suppliers
to get meter readings, which were then still manually collected
1In Dutch, Overige Diensten-Aanbieders (ODA’s).
2Fig. 1. Standardized smart meter
by the DSOs. EDSN also records for each connection which
energy supplier is contracted to deliver electrity.
A. The Smart Meter
The Dutch Smart Meter Requirements (DSMR) [6] and its
companion standards [7] lay down the specifications of smart
meters. As most houses in the Netherlands also have a natural
gas connection, smart meters meter both gas and electricity.
Several versions of the DSMR specs exist; the most recent
publicly available version is 4.0.7. Before the introduction of
the DSMR, requirements for smart meters were given in a first
technical spec NTA 8130 [8], but also in legal documents such
as amendments to the Dutch Energy Act [9].
The DSMR specifies that smart meters record and store the
following measurements, for the DSO to retrieve them (via
port P3, as explained in more detail below):
• daily and monthly aggregate measurements, namely
– the 40 most recent daily readings;
– the 13 most recent monthly readings;
• interval measurements for the last 10 days, namely
– electricity measurements in 15-minute intervals;
– gas measurements in hourly intervals.
In addition, the following measurements are made available to
the consumer (via port P1):
• electricity meter readings every 10 seconds, which are
not stored in the meter;
• the most recent gas meter reading;
• equipment status, including tariff information.
The meter can display messages sent by the DSO to the
meter. The meter itself can display up to 8 characters. Longer
messages of up to 1024 characters can be forwarded for
display on consumer equipment.
Besides energy consumption, the meter also measures power
quality and outages. It supports time synchronization and
shifting between tariffs. The meter has to have some tamper
detection, and at least the past 30 attempts to tamper with
the meter have to be stored. Here tampering means physical
tampering, such as removing the meter’s cover, but meters are
also required to detect magnetic fields that may interfere with
meter.
B. Physical Communication Infrastructure
The smart meter has 4 communication ports.
The P0 port is used for local connection during installation
and maintenance work.
The P1 port, also called the consumer port, allows for
communication with third party equipment locally installed at
the consumer’s house. The port only supports communication
from the meter to this equipment, not the other way around.
Via P1 the meter provides real-time measurements, in 10-
second intervals, and it can be used to display messages on
the connected equipment.
The P2 port connects to other local metering equipment.
The typical use is that a smart gas meter connects to P2. This
port can be wired or – more commonly – wireless. The gas
meter sends its measurements to the electricity meter once per
hour, which can then store and forward these.
The P3 port communicates with the DSO, for sending
meter readings (either the stored readings or the current
meter readings), status checks, power quality and outage
measurements, and remote updates. Unlike P1, P3 supports
two-way communication. Generally, communication between
P3 and the DSO happens via GPRS, CDMA, or LTE. Earlier
meters used a combination of Power Line Communication
(PLC) with GPRS, where information was sent via PLC to a
data concentrator located in the nearest substation which then
forwarded information via GPRS. Since the DSMR version 4
[6], all meters communicate wirelessly, and PLC is no longer
considered for use.
The P3 port uses the international standard IEC 62056
DLMS/COSEM [10] as communication protocol. This pro-
tocol defines a manufacturer-independent way to identify,
retrieve and interpret the information held in any meter.
The P4 port is the gateway for energy suppliers and ISPs
to obtain P3 measurements. It is a webservice to access the
Central Access Server (CAS) of EDSN. It allows an energy
supplier or ISP to obtain metering data of its customers,
irrespective of the responsible DSO. In the current set-up,
metering data is not pro-actively collected by EDSN into a
central database. Instead, the metering data is only stored in
the meter. When an energy supplier or ISP requires metering
data of one of its customers, it first has to request the data
from EDSN; EDSN forwards this request to the responsible
DSO, which in turn retrieves the data from the customer’s
meter via P3 and sends it to EDSN. EDSN caches the data,
and the energy supplier or ISP has to contact EDSN again, the
next day, to retrieve the data. Of course, energy suppliers and
ISPs then typically will store the data they retrieved in their
own databases.
So the difference between P1 and P3 data is not just that
P3 data is much less fine-grained (15 minute instead of 10
seconds intervals), but also that P3 data is not available in
real-time, as the process of collecting the data via P4 can take
up to 24 hours.
C. Security Overview
The physical communication infrastructure outlined above
comes with some technical security measures.
3Smart meters have cryptographic keys to secure communi-
cation with the DSO via P3: the data sent to the DSO can
be authenticated and encrypted. For a short overview of the
options this provides, we refer to [11]. Smart meters also have
keys to authenticate firmware updates.
However, at least some of the existing options for crypto-
graphic authentication in DLMS/COSEM have shortcomings,
as shown in [12], [13]. Moreover, whether these options are
used is up to the DSO2.
Unlike communication between the meters and the DSO,
communication between EDSN and an energy supplier or ISP
is over the public internet. This communication is secured
with TLS using client and server certificates. Note that, even
though the current version of DLMS/COSEM supports this in
principle, there is no end-to-end security from the meter to the
energy supplier or ISP – they have to trust the DSO to supply
the correct data.
Unlike P3 data, P1 data cannot be authenticated. This may
become an issue if in future evolutions of the grid one would
want to use P1 data for grid control, as discussed in Section V
D. Information Flows
The smart metering infrastructure provides information to
DSOs, to energy suppliers and ISPs, and to the customer.
1) Metering Data for DSOs: The code of conduct of the
Dutch DSOs [14] describes in detail why and when certain
metering data is read by DSOs. All DSOs are legally obliged
to conform to this code of conduct. It also describes the cases
where the DSO reads P3 data in order to send to third parties,
so it gives insight into the data flows from the smart meters
to ISPs and energy suppliers. As all of this only involves P3
data, it is never more detailed than 15-minute intervals.
The scenarios in the code of conduct are based on the DSO’s
legal obligations and fall in four main categories:
• grid management, i.e. processing by the DSO itself to
perform its legally mandated primary task;
• meter management, incl. communication with the meter
to ensure it is functioning correctly;
• experimentation, innovation, and open data, i.e. rules for
piloting new projects and providing anonymized data to
other parties; and
• market facilitation, i.e. providing metering data to ISPs
and energy suppliers.
The scenarios for grid management show that DSOs use
power quality data for outage detection, analysis, and predic-
tion, and for power quality monitoring. For detecting electric-
ity loss, theft, or fraud, the consumption data is also used.
As this is integral part of the DSO’s legally mandated task
the DSO is not required to get consumer permission for these
readings. However, if the consumer has chosen to administra-
tively disable their meter, as explained in Section III-B, it will
not be read for these purposes either.
2 In personal communication, one foreign DSO noted that noise in PLC
communication caused loss of a significant, but acceptable, number of
messages. When they enabled the ‘High-Level Security’ (HLS) option for
DLMS/COSEM in their smart meters, the authentication data increased the
message length to the point beyond which transmission reliability degraded
to an unacceptable level. This made it impossible to use HLS.
For meter management, the DSO can read all the informa-
tion for a short period, at most ten days, to verify that a newly
installed or updated meter is functioning correctly. Even if the
consumer has administratively disabled their meter, the DSO
can perform these measurements, as well as communicate with
it for performing clock updates, firmware updates, and other
maintenance-work.
The clause on experimentation and innovation in the code
of conduct encompasses the reading of metering data for the
purposes of research and pilot projects, as well as reuse of
aggregated data read previously. The former is only done with
consumer consent, the latter is deemed acceptable regardless
since it is aggregated data. To give an example, a research
project could be aimed at developing models of the electricity
use in a neighbourhood to aid in the planning of the electricity
grid in a new neighbourhoods, or revisions to existing grid.
The clause on open data is a broad clause to enable the pub-
lishing of data for the purposes of efficient market operation
and enabling new services. This is, again, done either through
reuse of aggregated data read in the past, or with new data
read after getting user consent.
2) Metering Data for energy suppliers and ISPs: The code
of conduct for the DSOs also indicates the obligations and
restrictions for DSOs to provide data to energy suppliers and
ISPs:
• a DSO has to provide meter readings to the energy
supplier every two months, as well as incidentally on
request from the energy supplier;
• if customers give permission to their energy supplier or
ISPs to access the 15-minute interval values, a DSO must
provide these upon request from these parties.
Obviously the energy supplier need access to metering data for
billing. For this they currently do not need detailed readings:
billing usually happens annually, or at most monthly, and
energy prices for customers do not fluctuate on a daily basis.
Therefore, monthly or even annual readings would suffice.
Instead of obtaining the 15-minute interval data via P3 via
the DSO and EDSN, an ISP can also obtain data via the P1
port. They then have to a consumer with a device to attach
to P1 to send back data, e.g. via that customer’s internet
connection. This information flow then circumvents the DSO
and EDSN.
3) Feedback to Consumers: One way in which all con-
sumers receive information from their smart meter is via bi-
monthly usage summary from their energy supplier. There is
now a legal requirement that the energy suppliers must provide
a bi-monthly usage summary to their customers. Research
from the Dutch association for home-owners showed that a
third of consumers do not receive a bi-monthly summary at
all, and that many summaries that are received do not conform
to legal requirements and are confusing to consumers [15].
Consumers can obtain additional information via an ISP, or
via their energy supplier if it offers services for this. Some
ISPs and energy suppliers can provide an in-home display for
feedback that obtains data via P1. Such a display can then
also stream P1 data back to the ISP or energy supplier via
the internet, as mentioned earlier. Alternatively, feedback to
customers can be based on P3 data presented via a smartphone
4app or website. Advantage of this is it does not involve
additional equipment or installation hassle to connect such
equipment with the local P1 port. Downside is of course that
this cannot provide information about the energy usage in real-
time. An annual report by the government agency RVO [2]
monitors the adoption of energy management services that use
P1 or P3 data, via apps, websites, and in-home displays.
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY
Some aspects of the smart meter infrastructure in the
Netherlands have changed considerably since the first propos-
als, partly in response to the public debate about privacy. In the
DSMR specs these changes are still visible: each requirement
is listed with the year of introduction and source that it is
based on. This section discusses the key issues and decisions,
and discusses some of the security incidents – all data leaks
– to date.
A. The remote off-switch
A remotely operated off-switch in a smart meter can be
convenient: if a household needs to be disconnected, it can
be done without having to send out an engineer. However,
it is also a security risk [16]: attackers might abuse it to
disconnect households or cause serious chaos by disconnecting
hospitals and police stations. This was also an important point
of contention during the pilot phases in the Netherlands. The
DSOs recognized this risk, and the remote off-switch was
abolished when the large-scale rollout of smart meters started
[1]. Meters installed before that time received a firmware
update to disable this functionality permanently. Meters that
could not be updated are considered in a periodic risk analysis.
Presumably the cost of replacing them was deemed to out-
weigh the security risk. The requirements that meters should
be able to receive firmware updates was already included in
NTA 8130 [8]. It is unclear to us how many meters could not
be updated to disable the remote off-switch.
B. Privacy
Meter readings at 10-second intervals reveal a lot of private
information. Research shows that this can reveal which TV
shows are being watched or whether a newborn child is in
the home [17], [18]. But even meter readings at 15-minute
intervals provide a detailed view into someone’s personal life.
Initial proposals of laws for smart meter roll-outs did not
consider consumer privacy beyond complying with the Dutch
data protection act, and ran foul of article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Mainly for that reason the First
Chamber of Parliament blocked them from passing in their
initial form. Only after several amendments did these laws
pass. For a detailed account, see [19]. These amendments
removed the obligation to have smart meters: people could
refuse installation and, if a smart meter had already been
installed, they would be able to have it ‘administratively
turned off’. The amendments also included regulations on
the collection, storage, and forwarding of metering data, and
required explicit consumer consent for 15-minute and daily
measurements, instead of this being the default metering
regime.
If a meter is turned off administratively, consumption data
and power quality data are no longer read remotely. The
DSO can only communicate with the meter to ensure its
proper functioning as an electricity meter, and to provide
firmware updates. In 2017, around 10% of consumers refused
installation of a smart meters and 2% had them turned off
administratively [2].
Since the passing of these laws, DSOs, energy suppliers,
and ISPs have all deposited codes of conduct with the Dutch
data protection authority, in which they confirm this policy of
explicit consent [14], [20], [21]. The code of conduct of DSOs
makes a distinction between privacy-sensitive metering data
and metering data that has no impact on consumer privacy.
Only the actual energy usage readings and the power quality
(as opposed to voltage quality) readings are privacy-sensitive
[14]. Power quality is related to power draw, and therefore to
energy usage behaviour. Voltage quality and information about
the meter itself, such as low-battery events and reachability,
are not considered privacy-sensitive.
Another design decision taken for privacy reasons is the
decision not to have a central storage of meter readings by
DSOs. Metering data is only stored in the smart meter itself.
At the request of an ISP or energy supplier the DSO will
retrieve the data, but it will not keep a copy, or proactively
collect data from meters to store in a central database.
Note that there is a trade-off between privacy and availabil-
ity here: downside of the current approach is that should a
meter malfunction, the metering data would be lost, including
the monthly readings for the past year used for billing. Billing
could then be based on best-guess estimates or data kept by the
energy supplier for the bi-monthly summary, but the energy
supplier is of course not an independent party, like the DSO
is, when it comes to billing.
The clauses on open data in the codes of conduct, mentioned
in Section II-D, show a very simplified view of the intricacies
of data (de-)anonymization and aggregation, which should be
adequately considered when publishing (anonymized) personal
data for third parties. Publishing anonymized data, when done
incorrectly, runs the risk of deanonymization [22].
C. Procurement, Compliance and Assurance
Taking security into account requires special care in the
public tendering process for smart meter. One issue is how
security requirements are expressed in tenders. If the descrip-
tion of security requirements is too vague, suppliers may be
able to argue that less secure meters meet them, resulting in a
race to the bottom. Conversely, if requirements are too detailed
or specific, there is the risk that only a single supplier can
meet them, who can then set a very high price. Another issue
is defining procedures and processes for security testing of
meters.
The expert organization ENCS stepped in to help both
with specifying security requirements in tenders [23] and
with testing smart meters considered for roll-outs [24]. ENCS
(European Network for Cyber Security) is a non-profit member
5organization that supports the deployment of secure solutions
for energy grids and infrastructure by bringing together se-
curity expertise and critical infrastructure owners. All the
Dutch DSOs are member of ENCS, as are several foreign
DSOs. ENCS also help Austrian DSOs in formulating security
requirements for tendering, and these have are publicly made
available online [25].
A well-known example from outside the Netherlands is
the approach taken in Germany here, where a Common
Criteria Protection Profile has been defined [26]. Common
Criteria security evaluations are notoriously time-consuming
and expensive, which may dissuade suppliers from entering
the market.
D. Data leaks so far
A few data leaks have become public in the past years,
which point to weak spots in the overall security.
One potential troublespot, already noted in [27], is the
authentication of consumers by energy suppliers and ISPs. Any
individual can contact an ISP claiming to live at some address
to then obtain meter readings of that household via this ISP.
An ISP could check the identity for instance by sending a
letter by mail with some access code needed for online access
to the meter readings, but this is costly and time-consuming.
Indeed, in 2015 a journalist demonstrated that some ISPs do
not perform any identity check whatsoever [28].
There have also been data leaks where an ISP or energy
supplier accidentially or deliberately abused their access to
data kept by EDSN. Note that these parties are simply trusted
to only request data from their own consumers. In 2016 an
employee of an energy supplier deliberately requested large
volume of consumer data from EDSN without cause [29]. In
2017 on the website of an energy supplier you could enter an
address and postal code to then obtain annual usage figures for
that address [30]. In both cases the data stolen or leaked did
not include monthly or 15-minute interval readings obtained
via P3. Instead, it involved data recorded in central registry of
EDSN: standardized yearly consumption, and in the first case
also customer names, addresses, current energy suppliers, and
end date of contracts.
To counter problems like the ones above, starting 2018 there
will be additional access control checks: customer-specific
information has to be supplied by an ISP or energy supplier
to the DSO as proof that customers have given permission
to access their data [31]. This information is either the last
three numbers of the customer’s bank account, or the year
and month of their birthday. This information might be easy to
obtain for attacker wishing to impersonate someone, in which
case it would not stop the impersonation attack. It would be
an obstacle to larger scale data leaks as the accidental and
deliberately data leaks mentioned above.
The ISPs and energy suppliers could perform stonger verifi-
cation of a customer’s identity. As mentioned before, sending
a letter is costly and slow. However, the smart meter does
provide a cheap and effective way to authenticate customers,
because the meter can display a message sent by the DSO via
the P3 port. So to check the identity of a customer, the smart
meter could display a message that the consumer has report
back to the ISP or energy supplier. Currently this option is
not used, and DSO do not support for Dutch ISP or energy
supplier sending such messages. In the UK, this functionality
is used to authenticate customers.
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR SMART METERS
The debate surrounding smart meters has not only been
about security and privacy, but also about whether the costs
outweigh the benefits. We do not presume to give any defini-
tive answer to this question, but try to give an overview of the
arguments.
The arguments in favour of smart meters can be summarized
as follows:
A. giving grid operators better insight in the grid;
B. reducing the cost and hassle of taking meter readings;
C. reducing fraud; and
D. giving consumers better insight in their electricity con-
sumption, in the hope that they will reduce their con-
sumption or shift consumption to off-peak moments.
Leaving aside security and privacy concerns, which we already
covered, the main arguments against smart meters are the costs
and whether the projected benefits outweigh these costs. A
problem here is that it is hard to predict or even quantify
some of these benefits, as discussed below.
A. Better Insight and Control for DSOs
The introduction of smart meters is only a small part of the
smart grid. The term ‘smart grid’ refers to the wider use of IT
to connect ever more sensors and actuators in the grid to give
better insight and more control. The need to make the grid
smarter primarily comes from the growing use of distributed
renewable energy sources: instead of a highly centralized
electricity supply by a few large and very predictable power
stations, electricity is increasingly supplied by a large number
of smaller sources, such as solar panels and windmilss, on
many locations. This decentralization, along with the inherent
variability of solar and wind power, make these energy sources
much harder to predict. Controlling supply and demand in
such a setting requires more insight and control of what is
happening, not just in the central high voltage part of the grid,
but also on a more local level, at lower voltage parts of the
grid.
DSOs, however, do not seem to need the power consumption
measurements from individual households at all [14]. Smart
meters do enable a more advanced form of measuring the
power supplied back to the grid than the classic single-
counter rotating-disk analog meters do, where the disk simply
rotates backwards. However, a non-smart digital meter can
also easily incorporate multiple counters, which the consumer
would simply provide separately to their energy supplier.
Smart meters could enable DSOs to directly control whether a
given solar installation is allowed to provide power to the grid
or not, but the current legal framework does not allow for this
and it brings additional security concerns. Similarly, limiting
the amount a connection can consume gives more fine-grained
control over the grid for the DSO. Again, however, this kind
6of dynamic adjustment is not supported by currently rolled out
meters, and not possible in the Dutch legal framework. There
are some experiments in this field, however, which we expand
upon in Section V. Considering this, we are left unsure about
the actual impact smart meters have on grid management.
B. Easier and more frequent meter readings
At first glance, this benefit seems the clearest: with smart
meters, it is no longer necessary for a meter reader to go
from house to house to take meter readings, as this can be
done automatically and remotely. This reduces cost for the grid
operator, and hassle for the consumer. Still, the actual benefit
in terms of cost saving will vary between countries, and for
the Dutch situation it is not so clear. For example, Swedish
grid operators have the legal obligation to read meters every
month [32], but in the Netherlands consumers without smart
meters are typically required to provide their own reading, and
only once a year, and the DSOs are only required to verify
the meter reading once every three years. Another factor is
that meters in the Netherlands are installed inside the house.
In countries where meters are fitted at the outside of houses,
sending someone around to take meter readings will be faster
and cheaper.
Smart meters may make it easier for households to switch
energy suppliers, by reducing the hassle for consumers and the
cost of having meters read. In that sense smart meters could
help with efforts to liberalize the energy market. However,
in the Netherlands, reading the meter by the DSO is not
a requirement for switching energy suppliers. Many Dutch
households already switch yearly between energy suppliers
even though they have a traditional meter. Whether the smart
meter itself has played or will play a significant role in the
liberalization of the energy market remains unclear.
C. Fraud reduction
Reliable and frequent meter readings that can be carried out
remotely can help to reduce certain forms of fraud [14]. One
such form of fraud is when energy is being consumed without
the consumer having a contract with an energy supplier. It is
unclear to us whether this constitutes a significant problem.
Another second is where a consumer is passing fraudulent
meter readings, though a customer that wishes to defraud the
energy supplier in this way could simply have their meter
turned administratively off, making the situation no better than
before.
Other types of electricity theft, such as tapping of electricity
in front of the meter [33] – a common practice to get free
electricity for illegal cannabis plantations – may also be
detected through comparing aggregate measurements, but this
would require a near-100% adoption of smart meters. Power
quality measurements may be useful to detect this kind of
fraud [14]. We have not found any public figures on the total
cost of energy fraud to the Dutch economy, let alone figures
about prevention, so the actual benefit remains unclear.
D. Power savings
Finally, we come to the subject of power saving. Reducing
the amount of fossil fuels consumed is a worthwhile goal.
However, the smart meter rollout has so far not resulted in the
predicted energy savings [2].
The most widely cited cost-benefit analysis of smart meters
for the Netherlands [32], commissioned by the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, estimates the cost of introducing smart
meters at 3.3 billion Euros and the benefits at 4.1 billion,
suggesting a clear financial benefit. However, the analysis
recognizes that large deviations are possible in benefits, for
example if more than 20% of consumers refuses the remote
meter reading, or if the energy savings turn out significantly
lower than projected. Consumer support is therefore a crucial
aspect, but consumer benefits and the broader public interest
are not reflected in the standardization process [34]. For the
broader EU, research suggests that dynamic tariffs need to
be adopted in order to ensure a net positive benefit [35].
The figure of 1.47 billion Euros in savings is based on 3.2%
electricity savings and 3.7% natural gas savings [32]. However,
more recent numbers show that the actual energy savings fall
short of this, and remain at 1% on average [36]–[38].
The main reason for this in the Netherlands seems clear:
most consumers do not see any feedback from the smart
meter, other than their yearly energy bill or a bi-monthly usage
summary. Such an historic overview of the past two months
turns out not to be useful for energy saving purposes [36], [37],
[39]. Rather, consumers should be informed of their energy
use at the moment it happens. Multiple studies performed in
the past ten years show that the usage of direct feedback, in
the form of in-home displays (IHDs), is effective in achieving
permanent energy savings. Research by energy supplier Eneco
shows that the usage of their own IHD increases energy
savings to 6.1% on natural gas and 3.2% on electricity [40].
In the UK, the smart meter roll-out by DSOs included an
IHD, and their pilot projects report significantly higher energy
savings [39]. In 2017 only 18% of housholds with a smart
meter in the Netherlands used any kind of energy management
services – app, website or in-house display; three quarters of
these are based on P3 data and do not involve an IHD [2].
In order to improve energy savings, the direct feedback to
consumers could be improved. In-home displays are costly,
so an alternative such as smartphone apps might be attractive.
However, the reports on energy savings imply that even apps
are not as effective as IHDs [37].
V. ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS
Several pilot projects are experimenting with local energy
communities and microgrids are attempting to create a layer
below the DSO, where a local neighbourhood does its own
load balancing and internal energy trading on a household
level. Discussions with DSOs and energy suppliers show that
the market is interested in experimenting with dynamic pricing
and automated feedback mechanisms, where e.g. household
equipment, car chargers, or battery banks automatically switch
on and off based on current price.
Such scenarios require real-time measurements of energy
usage to ensure grid stability and accurate pricing. We see
7a trend where the existing system based on the P3 port is
circumvented, and equipment that directly hooks into the P1
port is used to provide these measurements. This brings with
it several security and privacy issues.
First, the P1 port does not provide any way to authenticate
the data or its origin. Any billing or control process based
on data being received from the P1 port can be subverted by
simulating the port, which is trivial to do. At best, data ob-
tained via P1 could be cross-checked to see that it is consistent
with other data, e.g. P3 data or aggregate measurements taken
elsewhere. The former can of course only verify that the 15-
minute aggregate of the fine-grained P1 data is correct.
Second, a downside of using P1 rather than P3 is that
whereas P3 comes with integrated network support for remote
access, for a remote party to access P1 data will require some
additional network set-up. For instance, households could
forward the P1 data over their internet connections, but this
involves a lot of configuration and is likely to fail at times.
Third, on the subject of privacy, we expect similar issues
as mentioned in [19] with regards to article 8 of the ECHR,
because 10-second interval readings are highly sensitive data.
Although the microgrid pilots function on an explicit consent
principle, we are skeptical about this being sufficient in the
long run. Consumers will be tempted by lower cost, or simply
because it is ‘the right thing to do’. At some point, it may
even become the only option.
With regards to the authenticity and availability of the
data, the obvious thing to do would be to make the P1 data
available over P3, in real time. However, the capabilities of
the communication infrastruction may not be sufficient for
this. Also, the prwivacy risks increase with this data passing
through the DSO. Another solution would be to authenticate
the data coming from the P1 port, and then use a secondary
GPRS connection from the third party to directly upload the
data to them. Neither solution is ideal.
This discussion on the implications for privacy, but also
for grid safety and security, should be had before microgrids
become a common occurrence. The design of microgrids
should be done practising Privacy-by-Design [41].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have given an overview of the Dutch smart metering
situation, and explained the policy and design decisions that
have been made for privacy and security.
It is not our intention to argue for or against smart meters in
general, but there are certain aspects of the Dutch smart meter
roll-out that we think are wrong. In our opinion, the relative
ineffectiveness in power saving compared to the UK discussed
in Section IV-D suggests that the decision to leave the roll-out
of in-home displays to market forces may not have been not
the right one. We hope that this will be rectified in the future,
or that we are proven wrong and that the market will ensure
a high penetration of in-home displays in the coming years
– or even come up with better alternatives, such as apps that
provide concrete suggestions on actions consumers could take
to lower energy consumption.
The options for more granular grid management within
neighbourhoods and price incentivization described in sec-
tion V are promising possibilities. Unfortunately the current
design of Dutch smart meters does not allow for this to be
done securely. This is a consequence of two design decisions:
since the P3 port does not provide the required data – and
cannot provide data in real-time – the data from the P1
port must be used. However, this data is unauthenticated and
must be provided over a separate connection to the ISP. This
raises availability and security concerns, which cannot be truly
solved without a redesign of the smart meters. Measures such
as cross-checking with data from the P3 port might be used
to provide at least some basic level of data verification.
There should also be a discussion on the privacy implica-
tions of this granular grid management architecture. Data from
the P1 port can be used to infer very intimate details about
the lives of the consumers. Clear rules should be drawn up
for the use of fine-grained meter readings, before this kind
of architecture can become commonplace. Related to this,
we feel that the clauses on open data in codes of conduct
[14], described in section II-D, are potentially too broad.
They allow for publication of anonymized data. However,
if anonymization is not done correctly, there is the risk of
deanonymization. This should be taken into account whenever
data is being considered for publication.
Some lessons learnt can be applied to other fields of industry
automation, as well as other countries rolling out smart meters.
In particular, the problem of drawing up unambiguous security
requirements in public tenders discussed in Section III seems
to be a more general problem in industry automation. We have
also seen this in the related sector of Electric Vehicle charging
[42]. Specifying these requirements so that suppliers are forced
to meet the spirit of the requirements is hard, and should be
handled by security specialists, not by electrical engineers.
REFERENCES
[1] “Kamerbrief over besluit grootschalige uitrol slimme meters,”
Min. EZ, Mar. 2014.
[2] “Marktbarometer aanbieding slimme meters,” Netherlands En-
terprise Agency (RVO), 2018.
[3] “Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules
for the internal market in electricity and repealing Direc-
tive 2003/54/EC,” Official Journal of the European Union,
vol. 211, pp. 55–93, Aug. 2009. [Online]. Available: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/72/oj.
[4] J. Zheng, D. W. Gao, and L. Lin, “Smart meters in smart grid:
An overview,” in Green Technologies Conference, IEEE, 2013,
pp. 57–64.
[5] N. Uribe-Pe´rez, L. Herna´ndez, D. de la Vega, and I. Angulo,
“State of the art and trends review of smart metering in
electricity grids,” Applied Sciences, vol. 6, no. 3, p. 68, 2016.
[6] Dutch Smart Meter Requirements 4.0.7, Netbeheer NL, 2014.
[7] P1 companion standard - Dutch Smart Meter Requirements
4.2.2, Netbeheer NL, Mar. 2014.
[8] Basisfuncties voor de meetinrichting voor electriciteit, gas en
thermische energie voor kleinverbruikers, NTA 8130, 2007.
[9] “Besluit op afstand uitleesbare meetinrichtingen,” Min. EZ,
Oct. 2011.
[10] Electricity metering data exchange - the DLMS/COSEM suite
- application layer, IEC 62056-5-3, 2016.
8[11] S. G. Hoffmann, R. Massink, and G. Bumiller, “New security
features in dlms/cosem - a comparison to the smart meter
gateway,” in Innovative Smart Grid Technologies (ISGT ASIA),
IEEE, Nov. 2015, pp. 1–6. DOI: 10.1109/ISGT- Asia.2015.
7387098.
[12] L. Weith, “DLMS/COSEM protocol security evaluation,” Mas-
ter’s thesis, TU/e, Eindhoven, Netherlands, 2014.
[13] J. Choi and I. Shin, “DLMS/COSEM security level enhance-
ment to construct secure advanced metering infrastructure,”
in Proc. SEGS, 2013, pp. 11–16. [Online]. Available: http :
//doi.acm.org/10.1145/2516930.2516949.
[14] “Gedragscode slimme meters voor netbeheerders,” Netbeheer
NL, 2017.
[15] Brief over onderzoeksresultaten VKO, Vereniging Eigen Huis,
Nov. 2016. [Online]. Available: https : / / www. eigenhuis . nl /
docs / default - source / downloads / actueel / lees - de - brief - die -
vereniging-eigen-huis-schreef-aan-minister-kamp.pdf.
[16] R. Anderson and S. Fuloria, “Who controls the off switch?”
In SmartGridComm’2010, IEEE, 2010, pp. 96–101.
[17] A. Molina-Markham, P. Shenoy, K. Fu, E. Cecchet, and D.
Irwin, “Private memoirs of a smart meter,” in Proc. SenSys,
2010, pp. 61–66.
[18] U. Greveler, P. Glo¨seko¨tterz, B. Justusy, and D. Loehr, “Multi-
media content identification through smart meter power usage
profiles,” in Proc. IKE, 2012, pp. 383–390.
[19] C. Cuijpers and B.-J. Koops, “Smart metering and privacy
in Europe: Lessons from the Dutch case,” in European data
protection: coming of age. Springer, 2013, pp. 269–293.
[20] “Gedragscode verwerking door elektriciteits- en gaslever-
anciers en door de onder hun verantwoordelijkheid handelende
meetbedrijven van op kleinverbruikers betrekking hebbende
persoonlijke meetgegevens afkomstig uit slimme meters,” As-
soc. Energie-Nederland, Nov. 2012. [Online]. Available: https:
/ / autoriteitpersoonsgegevens . nl / nl / zelf - doen / gedragscodes /
gedragscode-slimme-meters-van-energieleveranciers.
[21] “Gedragscode verwerking door overige diensten aanbieders
(ODA’s) van op kleinverbruikers betrekking hebbende per-
soonlijke meetgegevens afkomstig uit slimme meters,”
VMNED and VEDEK, Jun. 2016. [Online]. Available: https:
/ / autoriteitpersoonsgegevens . nl / nl / zelf - doen / gedragscodes /
gedragscode-slimme-meters-van-overige-dienstenaanbieders.
[22] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov, “How to break anonymity of
the Netflix prize dataset,” CoRR, 2006, http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/
0610105.
[23] “ENCS and Enexis: Bringing structure to distribution automa-
tion cybersecurity requirements - a case study,” ENCS, Oct.
2017. [Online]. Available: https://encs.eu/resources/.
[24] Dutch smart meters get security tested by ENCS, NRG Mag-
azine, Dec. 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.nrgm.nl/
news/dutch-smart-meters-get-security-tested-by-encs/.
[25] “Requirements catalog - end-to-end security for smart meter-
ing,” O¨sterreichs E-Wirtschaft, 2018, Available form https :
//oesterreichsenergie.at/sicherheitsanforderungen- fuer- smart-
meter.html.
[26] “Protection profile for the gateway of a smart metering sys-
tem,” Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), 2011.
[27] B. te Paske, C. Cuijpers, M. van Eekelen, E. Poll, and B. van
Schoonhoven, “Risicoanalyse slimme meter keten - privacy en
security in het nieuwe marktmodel,” TNO, 2012.
[28] J. Meijers, Slimme meter makkelijk af te lezen voor iedereen,
Jan. 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.eerlijkemedia.nl/
slimme-meter/.
[29] Gegevens over energieverbruik twee miljoen huishoudens
gestolen, Sep. 2016. [Online]. Available: https : / / www. nu .
nl/internet/4320997/gegevens-energieverbruik- twee-miljoen-
huishoudens-gestolen.html.
[30] Data energieverbruik lagen op straat, Nov. 2017. [Online].
Available: https://www.bnr.nl/nieuws/technologie/10332399/
data-energieverbruik-lagen-op-straat.
[31] Impressie actieplan dataveiligheid, NEDU, 2017. [Online].
Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DslEEi eIkQ.
[32] R. van Gerwen, F. Koenis, M. Schrijner, and G. Widdershoven,
“Intelligente meters in Nederland - herziene financie¨le analyse
en adviezen voor beleid,” KEMA, 2010. [Online]. Available:
https : / / www. rijksoverheid . nl / documenten / rapporten / 2010 /
09/03/intelligente- meters- in- nederland- herziene- financiele-
analyse-en-adviezen-voor-beleid.
[33] Energiefraudeur wordt nauwelijks bestraft en is zelfs goed-
koper uit, Stedin, Feb. 2017. [Online]. Available: https : / /
www. stedin . net / over- stedin / pers - en - media / persberichten /
energiefraudeur - wordt - nauwelijks - bestraft - en - is - zelfs -
goedkoper-uit.
[34] R. Hoenkamp, G. B. Huitema, and A. J. de Moor-van Vugt,
“Neglected consumer: The case of the smart meter rollout in
the Netherlands,” RELP, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 269–282, Nov. 2011.
[35] A. Faruqui, D. Harris, and R. Hledik, “Unlocking the 53
billion savings from smart meters in the eu: How increasing
the adoption of dynamic tariffs could make or break the
eu’s smart grid investment,” Energy Policy, vol. 38, no. 10,
pp. 6222–6231, 2010.
[36] J. Uitzinger and D. Uitdenbogerd, “Monitoring en evalu-
atie van de slimme meter en het tweemaandelijkse ver-
bruiksoverzicht,” IVAM, Mar. 2014.
[37] K. Vringer and T. Dassen, “De slimme meter, uitgelezen
energiek,” Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
(PBL), Nov. 2016. [Online]. Available: http : / /www.pbl .nl /
publicaties/de-slimme-meter-uitgelezen-energiek.
[38] ——, “De slimme meter - policy brief,” Netherlands Envi-
ronmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Nov. 2016. [Online].
Available: http://www.pbl.nl/publicaties/de-slimme-meter.
[39] S. Darby, C. Liddell, D. Hills, and D. Drabble, “Smart
metering early learning project: Synthesis report,” DECC,
Mar. 2015. [Online]. Available: https : / / www . gov . uk /
government / uploads / system / uploads / attachment data / file /
407568/8 Synthesis FINAL 25feb15.pdf.
[40] K. de Ronde, Business case slimme meter wankelt, Energeia,
Nov. 2016. [Online]. Available: https : / / energeia .nl /nieuws/
40058986/business-case-slimme-meter-wankelt.
[41] P. V. Aubel, M. Colesky, J.-H. Hoepman, E. Poll, and C.
Montes Portela, “Privacy by Design for local energy commu-
nities,” in CIRED’18, 2018.
[42] “EV charging systems - security requirements,” ENCS, 2017.
[Online]. Available: https://encs.eu/resources/.
